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Individual criminal responsibility (ICR) in international law is sui generis. Whilst modelled on domestic 
concepts of liability, ICR deviates substantially from theories of liability in municipal law. The distinctive 
character of criminal responsibility in international law is characterized by both intrinsic and extrinsic 
features. Intrinsic features go to the nature of international crimes. Extrinsic features relate to what 
according to Cassese is typically ‘international’: the composition of international courts and the 
rudimentary character of the governing law. An analysis of case law through the lens of ICR’s distinctive 
features reveals international criminal law's instrumental role, which in turn puts pressure on the 
principle of personal culpability 
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1.  Introduction 
Individual criminal responsibility (ICR) is a general principle in both national and international 
criminal law. However, this principle in international criminal law bears unique traits that make 
it somehow different than its domestic counterpart.  
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Appeals Chamber 
held in Tadić ́that: 
 
[t]he basic assumption must be that in international law as much as in national systems, the 
foundation of criminal responsibility is the principle of personal culpability: nobody may be held 
criminally responsible for acts or transactions in which he has not personally engaged or in some 
other way participated (nulla poena sine culpa).1 
 
Antonio Cassese, Judge in the Tadić case, former President of the ICTY, and one of the most 
influential scholars in the field of international criminal law, always subscribed to that principle. 
In that, he adopted a pragmatic approach. Bringing individuals to justice was to be preferred over 
the collective assignation of guilt. 2 As history has shown, collective guilt fuels frustration, 
extremism, and eventually mass violence. In Cassese’s words, trials of (alleged) war criminals, 
‘establish that not all Germans were responsible for the Holocaust, nor all Turks for the 
Armenian genocide, nor all Serbs, Muslims, Croats, or Hutus but individual perpetrators — 
although, of course, there may be a great number of perpetrators’. 3 
A strong proponent of international criminal justice, Cassese found that international 
adjudication of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide has advantages over national 
adjudication, particularly over domestic tribunals in the territory where the atrocities occurred. 
Without being perceived as pursuing political prosecutions, international courts and tribunals can 
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1 Judgment, Tadić (IT-94-1-A), Appeals Chamber, 15 Ju ly 1995 (hereinafter Tadić, Appeal Judgment), § 186. 
2 A. Cassese, ‘Reflections on International Criminal Justice’, 61 The Modern Law Review (1998) 1, at 5‒ 6.  
3 Ibid., at 6. 
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prosecute breaches of the Geneva Conventions and the Genocide Convention as a principled 
demand for justice. 4 Moreover, the very nature of these crimes, violations of international law, 
calls for international adjudication. Furthermore, international judges are in a better position to 
be impartial and unbiased. 5  
Whilst sensitive to the specific (international) context of international courts and 
tribunals, Cassese, like most practitioners and scholars in the field, accepted that international 
criminal law takes after national criminal law. In his view, ‘ICL to a great extent results from the 
gradual transposition on to the international level of rules and legal constructs proper to national 
criminal law or to national trial proceedings’. 6 To his mind, the international nature of courts like 
the ICTY and ICTR comprised in their composition, their method of establishment, and the fact 
that ICL has a rudimentary character. 7 There would be no fundamental reason for departing from 
the domestic justice model and its underlying principles. Indeed, the principle of ICR captured in 
the maxim nulla poena sine culpa is a principle in ICL as much as it is in domestic law. As he 
states, ‘In ICL the general principle applies that no one may be held accountable for an act he has 
not performed or in the commission of which he has not in some way participated, or for an 
omission that cannot be attributed to him.’8  
 As in most domestic criminal justice systems, ICR is grounded in the philosophy of 
autonomy and free will. International criminal law subscribes to the liberal justice model, 
requiring proof of personal culpability for a finding of guilt and the imposition of punishment. 
Cassese as no other was aware of the collective dynamics of international crimes and the 
evidentiary challenges of linking the accused to the crimes. In a paper on the theory of Joint 
Criminal Enterprise (JCE), he writes that international crimes ‘tend to be an expression of 
collective criminality, in that they are perpetrated by groups of individuals, military details, 
paramilitary units or government officials acting in unison or in pursuance of a policy’. 9 This 
makes it ‘extremely difficult to pinpoint the specific contribution made by each individual 
                                                 
4 Ibid., at 7. 
5 Ibid., at 7-8. 
6 A. Cassese, International Criminal Law (2nd edn., OUP, 2008), at 7. 
7 Ibid., at 32, fn 1. (He notes, ‘This body of law has not attained the degree of sophistication proper to national legal 
systems.’) 
8 Ibid., at 33. 
9 A. Cassese, ‘The Proper Limits of Individual Responsibility under the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise’, 5 
Journal of International Criminal Justice (JICJ) (2007) 109, 110. 
 4 
participant in the collective criminal enterprise’.10 Yet, he continued, it would be ‘immoral’ and 
‘contrary to the general purpose of criminal law … to let those actions go unpunished’. 11 The 
notion of JCE, although controversial in some respects, was an answer to the dilemma of 
individual criminal responsibility for collective criminality. 12 Thus, Cassese, endorsing 
individualized justice as an antidote to collective responsibility, admits that individual guilt 
attribution is difficult. In fact, by embracing JCE he, to a certain extent, accepts collective 
responsibility.  
In scholarly writing, compelling arguments have been raised in favour of a concept of 
liability that is specific to international criminality; a concept that expresses the collective nature 
of international crimes. 13 The gist of the argument is that the extraordinary nature of 
international crimes calls for a departure from ‘ordinary’, domestic concepts of liability. ICR, a 
principle drawn from municipal law, is unsuitable to international criminality. While this debate 
raises pertinent questions, we will leave it aside for reasons of brevity.  
Instead this paper, through an analysis of jurisprudence before the ICTY and the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), and the identification of the main (intrinsic and extrinsic) 
features of ICR in international criminal law, will seek to identify the sui generis features of the 
principle. In particular, emphasis will be placed on showing how ICR is used as a tool to enforce 
international norms and to set an example. In this functional role, ICR is hardly compatible with 
the principle of personal culpability.  
 
2. Intrinsic Feature: the Systemic Nature of Criminality 
Criminal responsibility as it features in the Statutes of international criminal courts and tribunals, 
is modelled on concepts derived from national criminal law. Forms of liability such as 
aiding/abetting, instigation, joint criminal enterprise, co-perpetration and the concept of 
                                                 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., at 110‒ 111. 
13 M.A. Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment and International Law (CUP, 2007); G.P. Fletcher, ‘Liberals and Romantics 
at War: The Problem of Collective Guilt’, 111 Yale Law Journal (2002) 1499; H. Jäger, Makrokriminalität. Studien 
zur kollektiver Gewalt (Suhrkmp Verlag, 1989), at 132‒ 187; H.C. Kelman, ‘The Po licy Context of International 
Crimes’, in P.A. Nollkaemper and H.G. van der W ilt  (eds), System Criminality in International Law (CUP, 2009)  
26; M.J. Osiel, ‘The Banality of Good: Aligning Incentives Against Mass Atrocity’, 105 Columbia Law Review 
(2005) 1751, 1760; A. Smeulers and B. Holá, ‘ICTY and the Culpability of Different Types of Perpetrators’, in A 
Smeulers (ed.), Collective Violence and International Criminal Justice: An Interdisciplinary Approach (Intersentia, 
2010) 175.  
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conspiracy all derive from municipal criminal law and are transplanted to the realm of 
international criminal law. The only true international mode of criminal responsibility is 
command responsibility, which originates in military law and international humanitarian law.14
 International crimes have a specific nature. They connote organized, collective 
wrongdoing. 15 Typically international criminality is masterminded violence, in which crimes are 
instigated, permitted or tolerated by an ‘intellectual’ perpetrator and physically committed by an 
executive machinery. There are two different but connected levels of perpetration: the senior 
level and the execution level, which need to be linked because eventually, those who stand trial 
before international courts are punished for the actual crime. With regard to senior defendants 
who have ‘no blood on their hands’, this means that crimes are either imputed to them, or 
liability derives from that of the physical perpetrator through theories of derivative liability, e.g. 
aiding and abetting. Whichever way the crimes are attributed, a link must be established between 
those who have encouraged, permitted or tolerated crimes and those who have physically 
committed crimes. This two-tier liability scheme is the Achilles heel of ICL. Linking the 
intellectual perpetrator(s) to the physical perpetrator is a difficult task for any international 
prosecutor. It is also here that ICR is under pressure most and where the danger of it lapsing into 
collective responsibility looms largely. 16 
 The systemic nature of criminality is at odds with the individual focus of criminal 
responsibility. When there is a context of systemic violence, focusing on the individual can be 
reductionist. As André Nollkaemper observes, individuals are ‘[c]ogs in larger systems that may 
be beyond the reach of individual responsibility’.17 He refers to the case of Harun, former 
Minister of the Government of Sudan and Abd-Al-Rahman (a.k.a. Aly Kushayb) a Janjaweed-
leader, both indicted by the ICC for the crimes committed in Darfur. According to the ICC 
prosecutor they are part of a much larger organizational context.18 This is why, in a desire to 
capture that organizational context fully, a year after the indictments against Harun and Abd-Al-
                                                 
14 In the realm of defences the picture is more mixed. A distinction can be drawn between criminal law defences that 
have a national pedigree, e.g. duress, intoxicat ion and mental incapacity, and defences that have an international 
pedigree, e.g. superior orders, self-defence, reprisals and tu quoque. 
15 B.V.A. Röling, ‘Aspects of the Criminal Responsibility for Vio lations of the Laws of War’, in A. Cassese (ed.), 
The New Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict (Ed itoriale Scientifica, 1979) 138, 203. 
16 See E. van Sliedregt, ‘Criminal Responsibility in International Law: Liability Shaped by Policy Goals and Moral 
Outrage’, 14 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law & Criminal Justice (2006) 104‒ 114. 
17 P.A. Nollkaemper, ‘Introduction’, in Nollkaemper and van der Wilt (eds.), supra note 13, at 1. 
18 Ibid., at 2. 
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Rahman, the ICC Prosecutor indicted the person right at the top: the Sudanese Head of State, Al 
Bashir.  
At the ICTY, we have witnessed a similar move up the hierarchical ladder. The first 
generation cases, the so-called camp cases (Delalić and others, Kvočka and others, etc.), did not 
capture the full organizational context of the crimes, which was the creation of a greater Serbia 
through a campaign of ethnic violence. Only when the ICTY moved upwards in the chain of 
command and indicted those at the highest political levels, e.g. Radoslav Brđanin, Milomir 
Stakić and Slobodan Milosević, did the systemic nature become clear(er).  
The collective and organizational nature of international criminality is really only 
captured when those at the top are prosecuted. Only when a prosecutor moves up the hierarchical 
level is the role of the system fully recognized. However, this comes with evidentiary challenges 
and, as a result, with pressure on the principle of ICR. Linking senior defendants to individual 
crimes has generated broad liability theories that are difficult to reconcile with the principle of 
personal culpability.  
 
3. ICR in International Law: An Overview 
Criminal responsibility in international law is a dynamic concept, subject to constant change. At 
an abstract level one can capture the developments in the law of ICR in four phenomena, (A) the 
conception of JCE (B) departure from the national pedigree (C) transformation of liability 
theories, and (D) the quest for a liability theory that best expresses moral gravity (expressive 
justice).  
 
A. Conception of JCE  
Common purpose appeared in ICTY case law for the first time in the Furundžjia case, with 
Judge Cassese on the bench. It was defined as ‘co-perpetration involving a group of persons 
pursuing a common design to commit crimes’19 where ‘the accused must participate in an 
integral part of the torture and partake of the purpose behind the torture’ 20. It was distinguished 
from aiding and abetting which requires the accused to ‘[a]ssist in some way which has a 
substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime and with knowledge that torture is taking 
                                                 
19 Judgment, Furundžija (IT-95-17/1-T), Trial Chamber, 10 December 1998 (hereinafter Furundžija, Trial 
Judgment), § 210. 
20 Ibid., § 257 (i). 
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place’. 21 Central to common purpose liability is the common plan or purpose, which 
compensates for the lack of physical involvement in the crime and enables imputation of the 
crime at the same level as the physical perpetrator. In the words of the Furundžjia Trial 
Chamber: ‘Here the criminal law maxim quis per alium facit per se ipsum facere viderus (he 
who acts through others is regarded as acting himself) fully applies.’22 
 It was the Appeals Chamber in Tadić, again with Judge Cassese on the bench, that further 
developed ‘common purpose’ and that, on the basis of national and international precedents, 
formulated the elements that defined this mode of liability. Common purpose/JCE was used to 
ascribe to Tadić the killing of five men at the village of Jaskići. The deaths were considered 
‘natural and foreseeable consequences’ of the common purpose to ethnically cleanse the Prijedor 
region, a purpose to which Tadić had agreed. 23 This form of JCE, so-called extended JCE, is 
controversial for its attenuated link to the underlying crime and its potential to broaden beyond 
individual culpability.  
Since the ICTY Statute does not provide for the concept of common purpose/JCE, the 
Appeals Chamber based its findings on customary international law and subsumed it under 
‘committing’ in Article 7(1), which it held was justified by pointing to the object and purpose of 
the Statute and the inherent characteristics of crimes committed in warlike situations. 24  
 
B.  Departure from the National Pedigree 
The Tadić Appeals Chamber endorsed the Furundžjia Trial Judgment recognizing two distinct 
theories of liability: JCE and aiding and abetting. 25 The Chamber considered accessorial liability 
inadequate to hold Tadić liable for the Jaskići deaths. Considering him an aider or abettor ‘might 
understate the degree of (his) criminal responsibility’. 26 The rationale for creating a hierarchy 
between JCE and aiding and abetting was found in the wording: committing crimes versus aiding 
and abetting crimes.27 Moreover, as Cassese wrote in a paper on the limits of JCE, the distinction 
                                                 
21 Ibid., § 257(ii). 
22 Ibid., § 256. 
23 Tadić, Appeal Judgment, §§ 232‒ 233. 
24 Tadić, Appeal Judgment, §§ 189‒ 191.  
25 See G. Boas et al., International Criminal Law Practitioner Library, Elements of Crimes under International Law 
(CUP, 2008), 10‒13. 
26 Tadić, Appeal Judgement, § 192. 
27 Part icipants in a JCE are regarded as principals who commit crimes whereas aiders/abettors contribute to the 
commission of crimes as accessories/secondary participants and as such are held to be less culpable than co-
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comports with the reduced mens rea standard for aiding and abetting. 28 An aider and abettor 
‘only intends to assist,’ but ‘does not share the mens rea’ of the perpetrator, so that ‘in principle, 
the criminal liability of the aider and abettor is more tenuous (or less weighty) than that of the 
participant in a common criminal enterprise.’29 
 The hierarchy between aiding and abetting and JCE was endorsed in case law beyond 
Tadić. The Appeals Chamber in Šljivančanin held that, ‘[a]iding and abetting is a lower form of 
liability than ordering, committing, or participating in a joint criminal enterprise and may as such 
attract a lesser sentence’. 30 Empirical research on sentencing confirms that aiding and abetting is 
regarded less blameworthy than other modes of liability. 31  
Distinguishing between aiding and abetting and JCE-liability corresponds to the 
distinction between facilitators and co-perpetrators in some civil law systems.  The latter are 
more closely involved in the commission of crimes than the former.32 Facilitators are punished 
less severely as instigators and co-perpetrators who are punished analogous to, or as perpetrators. 
While there is no ‘proof’ to make explicit the civil law influence on developing aiding and 
abetting into a lesser mode of liability, it is not far-fetched to assume that it is through civil law 
Judges like Cassese, and later Schomburg, that this categorization emerged.  
This hierarchy is at odds with the domestic meaning of JCE and aiding and abetting. Both 
concepts, drawn from Anglo-American law, constitute forms of accomplice liability. 33 In 
principle no hierarchy exists between them; it is in the sentencing stage that role-variance and the 
degree of culpability is expressed. The difference between JCE and aiding and abetting lies in the 
link to the underlying crime. The latter requires a more specific link to crimes than the former.34  
                                                                                                                                                             
perpetrators. Judgment, Krstić (IT-98-33-T), Trial Chamber, 2 August 2001, §§ 643‒645; Judgement, Kvočka (IT-
98-30/1-T), Trial Chamber, 2 November 2001, §§ 278 and 284. 
28 Cassese, supra note 9, at 116. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Judgment, Šljivančanin (IT-95-13/1-A), Appeals Chamber, 5 May 2009, § 407. Other examples: Judgment, 
Vasiljević (IT-98-32-A), Appeals Chamber, 25 February 2004, §§ 181‒ 182; Judgment, Krstić (IT-98-33-A), 
Appeals Chamber, 19 April 2004, §§ 266, 275; Judgment, Sainović (IT-05-87-T), Trial Chamber, 26 February 2009, 
§§ 1209, 1211. 
31 B. Holá et  al., ‘International Sentencing Facts and Figures: Sentencing Practice at the ICTY and ICTR’, 9 JICJ 
(2011) 411, at 417. 
32 E. van Sliedregt, Individual Criminal Responsibility in International Law (OUP, 2012), 66‒ 67. 
33 See K.J.M. Smith, A Modern Treatise on the Law of Criminal Complicity (OUP, 1991); E. van Sliedregt, ‘Joint 
Criminal Enterprise as a Pathway to Convicting Individuals for Genocide’, 5 JICJ (2007) 184. 
34 See Smith, ibid., at 69; S.H. Kadish, ‘Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of Doctrine’, 73 
California Law Review (CLF) (1985) 323. 
 9 
There have been objections to the categorization of different types of offenders since it 
does not comport with Anglo-American law.35 In Odjanić, however, the majority of the Appeals 
Chamber, with a dissent of Australian Judge Hunt, affirmed that ‘joint criminal enterprise is to 
be regarded, not as a form of accomplice liability, but as a form of commission’. 36 This ruling, 
illustrates how a mode of liability develops into a sui generis concept when applied in a 
multinational context where different legal cultures meet.37  
JCE, and the distinction between those who ‘commit’ and those who aid and abet, gained 
ground outside the ICTY as well. 38 At the ICTR, the categorization comes with the same moral 
hierarchy as at the ICTY. 39 At the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), the RUF Trial 
Chamber stated that ‘aiding and abetting as a mode of liability generally warrants a lesser 
sentence than that imposed for a more direct form of participation’. 40 The recent conviction of 
Charles Taylor is interesting in that respect. Taylor was convicted for aiding and abetting war 
crimes and crimes against humanity and sentenced to 50 years in jail.41 Had he been convicted 
for JCE, the sentence would have been higher.42 Still, 50 years is a serious sentence in the overall 
SCSL sentencing practice. It seems that aiding and abetting does not automatically imply a 
lenient sentence; leniency is relative concept.43  
In essence, aiding and abetting in international criminal law appears to differ from its 
equivalent under domestic law; it has moved away from its Anglo-American pedigree. 44 
                                                 
35 See Separate Opinion of Judge David Hunt on Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanić’s Motion Challenging Jurisdiction 
– Joint Criminal Enterprise, Milutinović et al. (IT-99-37-AR72), Appeals Chamber, 21 May 2003, § 31. 
36 Ibid., § 20.  
37 See Van Sliedregt, Joint Criminal Enterprise as a Pathway, supra note 33, 184-207. 
38 ICTR: Decision on the Preliminary Motions by the Defence of Joseph Nzirorera, Édouard Karemera, André 
Rwamakuba and Mathieu Ngirumpatse Challenging Jurisdiction in Relat ion to Joint Criminal Enterprise, Karemera 
et al. (ICTR-98-44-T), Trial Chamber, 11 May 2004; Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Regarding Application of 
Joint Criminal Enterprise to the Crime of Genocide, Rwamakuba (ICTR-98-44-A72.4), Appeals Chamber, 22 
October 2004, §§ 19‒21, 31‒32; Judgment, Simba (ICTR-2001-76-A), Appeals Chamber, 27 November 2007. 
SCSL: Judgment, Sesay et al.(SCSL-04-15-A), Appeals Chamber, 26 October 2006; Further Amended Consolidated 
Indictment, Brima et al. (ARFC-case) (SCSL-2004-26-PT), Trial Chamber, 18 February 2005, § 33. 
39 Judgment, Semanza (ICTR-97-20-A), Appeals Chamber, 20 May 2005, § 388; Judgment, Ndindabahizi (ICTR-
01-71-A), Appeals Chamber, 16 January 2007, § 122. 
40 Sentencing Judgment, Sesay et al. (SCSL-04-15-T), Trial Chamber, 8 April 2009. 
41 Judgment, Charles Taylor (SCSL-03-1-T), Trial Chamber, 26 April 2012, § 6959. 
42 Sentencing Judgment, Charles Taylor (SCSL-03-1-T), Trial Chamber, 30 May 2012.  
43 Rather, it affects, along with other factors, the sentence of the convicted person. Charles Taylor’s capacity as a 
former head of state was an aggravating factor that seems to have counterbalanced the mitigation that 
aiding/abetting implies.  
44 The debate between Kevin Heller and Diane Amann on the Opinio Juris-blog is interesting in this respect. Heller, 
in a breaking-news art icle on the day of the conviction, commented that the conviction for ‘only’ aiding and abetting 
was a ‘stunning rebuke to the prosecution’ and a ‘colossal victory’ for Taylor thus embracing the mitigation that 
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C.  Transformation of Liability Theories 
1. JCE 
JCE in Tadić, and like the World War II precedents it was modelled on,45 was applied to a small-
scale, mob violence situation. Yet, JCE-law beyond Tadić mainly concerns large enterprises 
establishing liability of senior military and political leaders. Prominent examples are the cases of 
Krajisnik,46 Brđanin, 47 Martić,48 and Šainović and others. 49 The usage of JCE at leadership level 
has changed the concept of JCE as originally constructed.  
The common purpose/plan is JCE’s distinctive feature. Its scope, as to time and 
geographical location, has expanded considerably as a result of its application to large-scale 
enterprises. While the plan must amount to or involve the commission of a crime, it does not 
require an accused’s contribution to a JCE to be criminal. 50 Common plans or objectives may be 
as broad as persecution, deportation and forcible transfer in a certain area or with regard to a 
certain group of people. These objectives can be achieved through the commission of specific 
crimes such as murder, torture and rape. 51 The objective can be even more at a ‘meta- level’, e.g. 
the aim to modify the balance of Kosovo through the commission of deportation, murder, 
forcible transfer and persecution52 or ‘the establishment of an ethnically Serb territory through 
the displacement of the Croat and other non-Serb population’ 53.  
The structure of this type of JCE-liability with criminal objectives at meta- level and 
specific crimes at micro level, generated a theory of liability where the crimes committed by 
                                                                                                                                                             
aiding/abetting implies: http://opiniojuris.org/2012/04/26/breaking-charles-taylor-convicted-but/, accessed on 1 May 
2012. Responding to Heller — in the period before the sentence was announced — Amann faults the attempts to 
minimize the conviction of Taylor. Referring to the US Criminal Code she makes clear that there is no reason to 
regard aiding/abetting a lesser form of liability: ‘Thus in the United States — a jurisdiction whose behavior 
contributes to the state practice that forms customary international law — an aider and abettor is equally criminally 
responsible, and subject to equal punishment, as the principal perpetrator of a crime’. 
http://www.intlawgrrls.com/2012/04/questions-on-aiding-abetting.html, accessed on 1 May 2012 
45 Trial of Erich Heyer and six others, British Military Court for the Trials of War Criminals, 18‒19 and 21‒ 22 
December 1945, UNWCC, Vol. I, 88 et seq. 
46Judgment, Krajisnik (IT-00-39-A), Appeals Chamber, 17 March 2009 (hereinafter Krajisnik Appeal Judgment). 
47Judgment, Brđanin (IT-99-36-A), Appeals Chamber, 3 April 2007 (hereinafter Brđanin, Appeal Judgment). 
48Judgment, Martić (IT-95-11-A), Appeals Chamber, 8 October 2008 (hereinafter Martić Appeal Judgment). 
49 Judgment, Šainović et al. (IT-05-87-T), Trial Chamber, 26 February 2009.  
50 As long as the acts significantly contribute to the common criminal objective they can generate criminal liab ility. 
Krajisnik  Appeal Judgment, § 218.   
51 Judgement, Kvočka et al. (IT-98-30/1-A), Appeals Chamber, 25 February 2008, §§ 319‒ 320. 
52 Amended Joinder Indictment, Milutinović et al./ Sainović et al. (IT-05-87-PT), 21 June 2006, §19. 
53 Martić Appeal Judgment, § 445. 
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those on the ground (‘relevant physical perpetrators’ or ‘principal perpetrators’) are imputed to 
those at leadership level. This is a very different form of JCE as conceptualized in Tadić. 
The leading case that marks this transformation of JCE is Brđanin. 54 The key finding, 
changing JCE is that the principal perpetrator does not have to be a member of the JCE. The 
Appeals Chamber found that ‘[w]hat matters is … not whether the person who carried out the 
actus reus of a particular crime is a member of the JCE but whether the crime in question forms 
part of the common purpose’. 55 To hold a member of the JCE responsible for crimes perpetrated 
by a non-member, it is sufficient to show that at least one member of the JCE can be linked to a 
non-member. When the latter is used by the former as a tool to carry out the common criminal 
purpose, the other participants of the JCE can be held equally liable for the crimes. 56  
The appellate ruling in Brđanin introduced a vertical57 or inter-linked form of JCE. 58 The 
Brđanin judgement enabled the prosecutor to apply JCE entirely at leadership level, as long as it 
can be shown that one of the participants is linked to the physical perpetrator who is used as a 
tool to carry out the crime(s). On the basis of this ruling the link between the JCE participants 
and the principal perpetrator(s) effectively loosens. This ‘delinking’ through the acceptance of 
non-membership of the physical perpetrator, fits the nature of system criminality as discussed 
previously. 
Loosening the link between participants in the JCE at leadership level and perpetrators at 
execution level raises concerns with regard to the principle of personal culpability. An attenuated 
link increases the possibility of guilt by association. 59 We are reminded here of what Cassese 
wrote with regard to the Trial Chamber judgment in Brđanin, 
 
To extend criminal liability to instances where there was no agreement or common plan between 
the perpetrators and those who participated in the common plan would seem to excessively 
                                                 
54Brđanin Appeal Judgment. See C. Farhang, ‘Po int of No Return: Joint Criminal Enterprise in Brđanin’, 23 Leiden 
Journal of International Law (LJIL) (2010) 137.  
55 Brđanin Appeal Judgment, § 410. 
56 Ibid., § 413. 
57 ‘Vert ical’ in the sense of a senior person using another as a tool to commit crimes. This can be opposed to a 
‘horizontal’ JCE like that of Tadić where all perpetrators are engaged with crimes at the same level. 
58 See also J.D. Ohlin, ‘Second-Order Linking Principles: Combining Vertical and Horizontal Modes of Liability’, 
25 LJIL (2012) 771. 
59 The Brđanin Appeals Chamber was aware of coming close to exceed ing the limits of indiv idual responsibility and 
emphasized that ‘JCE is not an open-ended concept that permits conviction based on guilt by association.’ (§ 428) 
Judge Van den Wyngaert in a separate declaration draws attention to the safeguards enumerated in the Judgement 
and the requirement of a ‘significant contribution’ to the criminal endeavour. Brđanin Appeal Judgment, Declaration 
of Judge Van den Wyngaert, § 7. 
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broaden the notion, which is always premised on the sharing of a criminal intent by all those who 
take part in the common enterprise (and this premise is the sine qua non condition for the possible 
additional liability arising in the third category of JCE, where the ‘primary offender’ commits a 
further crime, not envisaged in the common plan). 60 
 
In substantiating the existence of a vertical JCE in international law, the Appeals 
Chamber relied on only two cases, the Justice case and the RuSHA case. This is not sufficient to 
sustain a customary law basis. The judges themselves were aware of the thin legal basis 
supporting vertical JCE as evidenced by their statement that these cases have been ‘interpreted as 
a valid source of the contours of joint criminal enterprise liability in customary international law 
[emphasis added].’61  
 
2. Superior Responsibility 
Analysis of ICTY case law with regard to superior or command responsibility62 shows a division 
into first, second and third generation cases. 63 The first generation of cases concerns the 
detention camp cases and the land mark ruling in Delalić and others.64 The second-generation 
case law emerged with the ruling in Hadžihasanović and others on so-called successor superior 
responsibility. 65 Since the latter decision, two views of command responsibility can be identified: 
command responsibility as mode of liability and command responsibility as separate offence, as 
a failure to act. 66 The linkage between superiors and culpable subordinates has been gradually 
loosened in what can be regarded third generation cases, starting with Blagojević and Orić. 
                                                 
60 Cassese, supra note 9, at 126. 
61 Ibid., § 415. 
62 These terms are used interchangeably. 
63 E. van Sliedregt, ‘Command Responsibility at the ICTY. Three Generations of Case Law and still A mbiguity’, 
A.W. Swart et al.  (eds.), The Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (OUP, 
2012). 
64 Judgment, Delalić et al. (IT-96-21-T), Trial Chamber, 16 November 1998 and Appeals Chamber, 20 February 
2001. 
65 This concerns the liability of commanders for crimes committed by their subordinates before they assumed 
command and which have not been punished once the commander assumed command. Decision on Joint Challenge 
to Jurisdiction, Hadžihasanović et al. (IT-01-47-AR72), Appeals Chamber, 16 July 2003. See B. Sander, 
‘Unravelling the Confusion Concerning Successor Superior Responsibility in the ICTY Jurisprudence’, 23 LJIL 
(2010) 105; A.M.M. Orie, ‘Stare decisis in the ICTY Appeal System? Successor Responsibility in the 
Hadžihasanović Case’, 10 JICJ (2012) 365. 
66 The fact that these views emerged relat ively late into the ICTY’s existence is because command responsibility as 
a liability theory was for a long time ignored by the prosecutor who favoured JCE as a basis of liability. This had to 
do with the fact that command responsibility, certainly in early cases, has been regarded as narrowly defined, 
requiring a close link between superiors and subordinates, which was unappealing for a prosecutor seeking to secure 
convictions. See Sander and Orie, supra note 65. 
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These are cases of more senior defendants and of operational commanders — commanders in the 
field — who are further removed from the scene of the crimes than the superiors that stood trial 
in the early case of Čelebići. 
A number of requirements need to be met before a defendant can be held accountable 
under the theory of superior or command responsibility. 67 Two of these requirements are 
demanding: that the superior-subordinate relationship is governed by ‘effective control’, and that 
a commander knew or had reason to know of subordinate crimes.  
Over the years superior or command responsibility has expanded through a broad 
interpretation of ‘commission’. In Blagojević, and Orić ‘commission’ was interpreted as 
encompassing all modes of participation listed in Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute, planning, 
ordering, instigating, and aiding and abetting crimes.68 This position has also been adopted at the 
ICTR. 69 A further broadening was sought in the Karadzić indictment where the prosecutor 
alleged that the defendant could be held liable for the crimes that his subordinates, in turn, failed 
to prevent or punish. In other words, ‘commission’ in Article 7(3) encompasses superior 
responsibility, which enables a form of ‘superior responsibility for superior responsibility’ or 
‘multiple superior responsibility’.70 
Superior responsibility further expanded by interpreting ‘subordinate’ as to include those 
who are not directly subordinate to a superior. 71 Moreover, a superior can be held responsible for 
acts of ‘unidentified’ subordinates. It suffices to specify to which group the perpetrator belonged 
to and to prove that the accused exercised effective control over that group. 72 
For the sake of brevity I will not go into the details, but on a broad level, it can be argued 
that also in the area of superior responsibility notions have been broadened that loosen the link 
between subordinates and superiors and hence raise concern as to the state of  the principle of 
                                                 
67 Namely (i) the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship; (ii) that the superior knew or had reason to know 
that the subordinate was about to, or had committed a crime (excluding a negligence standard) and (iii) that the 
superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal act or to punish the perpetrator 
thereof.  
68 Judgment, Blagojević and Jokić (IT-02-60-A), Appeals Chamber, 9 May 2007, §§ 277–285; See Orić Trial 
Judgment, § 20 (hereinafter Orić, Trial Judgment); Judgment, Boškoski and Tarculovski (IT-04-82-T), Trial 
Chamber, 10 Ju ly 2008, § 404.  
69 See Nahimana et al. (ICTR-99-52-T), Trial Chamber, 3 December 2003, §§ 485 et seq. 
70 See C. Meloni, Command Responsibility in International Criminal Law (TMC Asser Press, 2010) 89‒ 91 
(referring to superior responsibility per superior responsibility), and G. Mettraux, The Law of Command 
Responsibility (OUP, 2009) 134‒137 (using the term ‘perpendicular command responsibility’). 
71 Orić, Trial Judgment, § 478. 
72 Judgment, Hadžihasanović & Kubura (IT-01-47-T), Trial Chamber, 15 March 2006, § 90. See Meloni, supra note 
70, 87‒89; Mettraux, supra note 70, 159‒ 162. 
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individual culpability. There appears to be little or no support for the broadening of Article 7(3) 
ICTY Statute through the interpretation of the notion of ‘commission’ or of ‘subordinate’.73  
 
D. The Quest for Expressive Justice  
A fourth phenomena that describes the development of ICR in international law, is the quest for 
a liability theory that not only captures systemic crime but that also serves the expressive 
function of ICL; a theory that enables ‘fair labelling’.  
Increasingly, value is attached to fair labelling requiring that liability be branded in a way 
that it fairly represents the nature and magnitude of the law-breaking. 74 In the words of David 
Nersessian, ‘The fair labelling principle aims to ensure that the label describing criminal conduct 
accurately reflects its wrongfulness and severity ... . A proper label reflects both the essence and 
the totality of the criminal conduct.’ 75  Fair labelling accounts for the advance of the 
normative approach to criminal participation and the desire to adhere to the distinction between 
those who are culpable as principals and those who are culpable as accessories.  
In the normative approach a principal is the one who is ‘most responsible’ in the sense 
that he or she has decisive influence on the commission of the crime, without necessarily 
physically committing it. This contrasts to what one can term the ‘naturalistic approach’ to 
liability76, which takes as starting point the natural world and the reality of cause and effect. In 
the naturalistic approach the principal is the one who most immediately causes the actus reus/the 
offence. The accessory is the one who contributes to causing the actus reus. This generally 
means that the principal is the physical perpetrator and the accessory or secondary party the 
intellectual perpetrator. Anglo-American complicity law is the classic example of a naturalistic 
approach.  
                                                 
73 For instance Art. 86 of Additional Protocol I, ILC draft codes; Art. 28 ICCSt.; UN Darfur Report. See Mettraux, 
supra note 71, at 135. 
74 On fair labelling: A. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (6th edn., OUP, 2009), at 78; A. Ashworth. ‘The 
Elasticity of Mens Rea’, in C. Tapper (red.), Crime, Proof and Punishment: Essays in Memory of Sir Rupert Cross 
(Butterworths, 1981) 45, 53. D. Guilfoyle, ‘Responsibility for Collective Atrocities: Fair labelling and Approaches 
to Commission in International Criminal Law, Current Legal Problems (2011), at 6 (doi:10.1093/clp/cu006). 
75 D. Nersessian, ‘Comparat ive Approaches to Punishing hate: The Intersection of Genocide and Crimes Against 
Humanity’, 43 Stanford Journal of International Law (2007) 254, 255‒ 256. 
76 On normative and naturalistic approaches to criminal participation in international law, see J. Vogel, ‘How to 
Determine Individual Criminal Responsibility in Systematic Contexts: Twelve Models’, Cahiers de Défense Sociale 
(2002) 151; Van Sliedregt, supra note 33, 71‒ 73. 
 15 
The previously discussed evolution of aiding and abetting as a lesser form of liability and 
the concomitant bolstering of JCE-liability as committing, which connotes principal liability, is 
illustrative for the advance of the normative approach in ICTY case law. Participants in a JCE 
are to be termed ‘principals’ and not accessories; accessorial liability would not suffice to 
express their role as masterminds.  
Preference for categorization, i.e. creating a hierarchy of liability in normative terms, is 
even stronger at the ICC where the distinction between principals and accessories is cultivated 
through the adoption of the theory of ‘control of the crime’. 77 The Pre-Trial Chambers in the 
confirmation decisions in Lubanga and Katanga distinguish between principal liability in 
subparagraph (a) and accessorial liability in subparagraphs (b-d). While they do not say so in so 
many words, 78 the PTCs’ decisions in Katanga and Lubanga imply that a principal-accessory 
classification indicates a greater or lesser degree of responsibility. Charging defendants as 
intellectual or remote principals under 25(3)(a) means they played a central role, that they had 
‘control of the crime’.79 This is contrasted to liability under subparagraphs 25(3)(b-d) where 
control plays no role. 80 Consider for instance Gerhard Werle and Boris Burghardt’s comment, ‘in 
light of the principle of culpability, a mode of participation that requires control over the crime 
inevitably results in a higher degree of individual criminal responsibility than a mode of 
participation not based on such control. This has to be reflected in the sentencing stage.’81 
The legal basis of the control of the crime theory is found in German legal doctrine. This 
has evoked criticism for not being widely accepted, let alone being established in customary 
                                                 
77 Decision on the Conformat ion of Charges, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/01-01/06, 
ICC, P-T. Ch. I, 29 January 2007, §§. 330-335; Decision on the Conformation of Charges, Prosecutor v. Katanga et 
al., Case No.  ICC-01/04-01/07, ICC, P-T. Ch. I, 26 September 2008, §§. 506-508. 
78 See Olásolo, who refers to non-principal liability, as ‘mere’ part icipation and ‘only’ accessorial liab ility. H. 
Olásolo, The Criminal Responsibility of Senior Political and Military Superiors as Principals to International 
Crimes (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009), at 13 and 15. Schabas, with regard to the liab ility of Eichmann and 
Schreibtischmörder more generally, ‘Characterizing those who do not physically commit the crime as ‘accomplices’, 
however, fails to capture the significance of their role’, W.A. Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A 
Commentary on the Rome Statute (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) at 431. 
79 Consider for instance § 518 of the Katanga et al. Confirmation Decision: ‘The leader’s ability to secure this 
automatic compliance with his orders is the basis for his principal – rather than accessorial – liability. The highest 
authority does not merely order the commission of a crime, but through his control over the organisation, essentially 
decides whether and how the crime would be committed’. 
80  The PTCs in Lubanga and Katanga reject the ICTY understanding of JCE-liability as a form of co-
perpetration/principal liab ility and instead regard common purpose liability in 25(3)(d) as a ‘residual form of 
accessorial liab ility’ since it is caught in term of contributing to the commission of crimes. Katanga Confirmation 
Decision, § 483 and the Lubanga Confirmation Decision, § 337. 
81 G. Werle and B. Burghardt, ‘Indirect Perpetration: A Perfect Fit for International Prosecution of Armchair 
Killers?’ 9 JICJ   (2011) 85, at 88. 
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international law. 82 Like JCE, ‘control of the crime’ is a product of judicial creativity. In a 
dissenting opinion to the Lubanga judgment, Judge Fulford opines that a plain reading of the 
Statute does not support the ‘control of the crime’ theory nor does it provide for a hierarchy of 
liability. In his view, Article 25(3) of the ICC Statute contains a number of overlapping modes of 
liability. 
The fact that international courts adhere to a principal–accomplice classification is 
noteworthy, particularly since labelling does not come with a mandatory mitigated or increased 
sentence in international law. Moreover, accessories are punished for the underlying crimes and 
not for ‘participating in’ or ‘contributing to a crime’. As John Gardner, in his analysis of 
complicity law, writes, ‘Someone against whom it is proved that they aided, abetted, counselled 
or procured the commission of murder by another – for example, by supplying the gun which 
fired the fatal shot – is herself convicted of murder. So far as her conviction goes, it is just as if 
she had pulled the trigger herself.’ 83 This nuances the distinction between principals and 
accessories and the need to rely on the classification of ‘principal’ for the sake of fair labelling. 
Cultivating the principal–accomplice distinction and embracing the normative approach 
to participation is prompted by the desire to bolster the principal-status. 84 Stigmatization through 
the principal status is important bearing in mind the denunciatory and educational function of 
punishment.85 Making clear who masterminded crimes by referring to him/her as ‘principal’ who 
‘commits’ crimes is important in communicating to victims and the international community as a 
                                                 
82S. Manacorda and C. Meloni, ‘Indirect Perpetration versus Joint Criminal Enterprise. Concurring Approaches in 
the Practice of International Criminal Law?’ 9 JICJ (2011), 159‒ 178, at 170. See also T. Weigend, ‘Perpetration 
Through an Organization. The Unexpected Career o f a German  Legal Concept’, 9 JICJ (2011) 91‒ 111, 105. 
83 J. Gardner, 'Aid, Abet, Counsel, Procure: an English View of Complicity’, in A. Eser et al. (eds), 
Einzelverantwortung und Mitverantwortung im Strafrecht. European Colloquium 1996 on Individual, Participatory 
and Collective Responsibility in Criminal Law (Max Planck Publicat ions, 1998), 227‒ 228.     
84 Consider in this respect Flavia Zorzi Giustiniani’s paper on the ICTR Appeals Chamber’s ru ling in Seromba 
where a broad concept of ‘commission’ was adopted, arguing that instigation would have been more appropriate. 
According to Zorzi Giustiniani this was to impose a severe and exemplary punishment on Seromba: F. Zorzi 
Giustiniani, ‘Stretching the Boundaries of Commission Liability: The ICTR Appeals Judgment in Seromba’, 6 JICJ 
(2008) 783, at 798. See also G. Townsend, ‘Current Developments in the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda’, 5 ICLR (2005) 147, at 156. 
85 M. Drumble, Atrocity, Punishment and International Law (CUP, 2007), at 174. In sentencing practice, this 
translates to attaching much weight to the sentencing purposes of retribution and deterrence. Judgment, Delalić et al. 
(IT-96-21-A), Appeals Chamber, 20 February 2001, § 806; Sentence, Serushago (ICTR 98-39-S), Trial Chamber, 5 
February 1999, § 20; Judgement In Sentencing Appeals, Tadić (IT-94-1-A and IT-94-1-Abis), Appeals Chamber, 26 
January 2000, § 48. Judgment, Brđanin (IT-99-36-T), Trial Chamber, 1 September 2004, § 1092; Judgment, 
Furundžija (IT-95-17/1-T), Trial Chamber, 10 December 1998, §§ 287‒291; Judgement and Sentence, Ruggiu, 
Case No. ICTR-97-32-I, ICTR, T.Ch., 1 June 2000, § 33; Cf. R. Henham, ‘Some issues for sentencing in the 
International Criminal Court’, 52 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2003), at 81. Note also § 5 of the 
preamble of the ICC Statute and the aim to contribute to the prevention of such crimes. 
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whole, who was the ‘real’ culprit.86 Against this background, the naturalistic approach to 
criminal participation, referring to masterminds as secondary participants, seems inadequate.  
 
4.  Extrinsic Features: Multiculturalism and Flexibility 
The four phenomena described above support the argument that ICR has a sui generis nature. 
Moreover, from the overview, two extrinsic features of ICR emerge: multiculturalism and (some) 
flexibility of the law.  
As to multiculturalism, it is not difficult to discern in the JCE/aiding and abetting debate, 
the common law position, on the one hand, and the civil law position, on the other hand. A 
similar divide of legal cultures can be discerned in the debate on the distinction between 
principals and accessories, which brings to light the difference between the naturalistic approach 
and the normative approach to criminal participation. The former represents Anglo-American 
complicity law, the latter civil law categorization of modes of liability. The multinational 
composition of international courts has led to misunderstandings and jurisprudential disputes, 
pulling liability theories in either a common law or a civil law direction. Eventually, 
multiculturalism lead to concepts that have no precise equivalent in domestic law and do not 
belong to either legal tradition and in that sense qualify as truly sui generis.  
The second extrinsic feature that surfaces from the overview of case law is the flexibility 
of legal concepts. Two reasons seem to drive the evolution of the law in the area of liability. One 
is the quest for the liability theories that best serve the expressive function of international 
criminal law. The other is a result-oriented approach towards adjudication where judges 
redevelop and transform theories of liability to make them fit the facts and a certain (senior) class 
of defendants. The evolution of JCE and superior responsibility shows how fluid the law is and 
how the need to adjust to reality is an important factor. 
In international criminal law, judges play an important role in clarifying and 
developing the law through interpretation of statutes and treaties as well as identifying 
customary law. Antonio Cassese was a proponent of what can be referred to as ‘progressive law-
making’. 87 He believed that the rudimentary character of international criminal law allowed for 
                                                 
86 See C. Kress, ‘Claus Roxins Lehre von der Organisationsherrschaft und das Völkerstrafrecht’, 153 Goltdammer’s 
Archiv für Strafrecht (2006) 304, at 308; Weigend, Perpetration through an Organization, supra note 83, 102‒103. 
87 In particular his view to the ascertainment of custom, see A. Cassese, ‘The ICTY: A Liv ing and Vital Reality’, 2 
JICJ (2004) 585.  
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progress and a certain flexibility with regard to the principle of legality.88 Through judicial 
interpretation international humanitarian law has been updated 89 and crime definitions and 
liability theories have been developed. Certainly in the early stages, it was necessary for 
international criminal justice to be a ‘creative interpretational enterprise’.90 But while there is 
merit in filling gaps of a rudimentary law, what about transforming existing law and liability 
theories? Are there limits to judicial development, and if so, what are they?  
Here we can refer to theories on casuistry. In The Abuse of Casuistry, 91 Albert Jonsen and 
Stephen Toulmin argue that there is good and bad casuistry: it is bad when different situations 
are treated the same without a clear motivation or explanation or when similar situations are 
treated differently without a justification for this differential treatment. Good casuistry is the 
opposite; it recognizes the inevitability of facts changing legal concepts and justifies and makes 
explicit the reasons for such a change. Bad casuistry violates the principle of legal certainty; 
good casuistry does not.  
Casuistry is inevitable, also in international criminal law. Yet one wonders whether some 
of the case law discussed previously stands the test of good casuistry. The transformation of 
JCE-liability and superior responsibility has not been motivated in light of the facts and, most 
importantly, of earlier findings and case law. Treating JCE-liability in Brđanin as if it were the 
same as in Tadić is, in my view, not good casuistry and not comporting with the principle of 
legality. 
 
5. Culpability Principle under Pressure 
Allison Danner and Jennifer Martinez, who regard international criminal law as an outgrowth of 
three legal traditions — domestic criminal law, international human rights law, and transitional 
justice — convincingly argue that the victim-oriented approach of human rights proceedings and 
the 'wide-angle lens' of criminal trials in the transitional context account for the expansion of 
ICR in international law. 92 In their view, the international criminal justice model enhances the 
                                                 
88 Cassese, supra note 6, at 32, fn. 1. 
89 See for instance E. Crawford, The Treatment of Combatants and Insurgents under the Law of Armed Conflict 
(OUP, 2010). 
90 J. Powderly, ‘Jud icial Interpretation at the Ad Hoc Tribunals: Method from Chaos?’ in S. Darcy and J. Powderly 
(eds), Judicial Creativity at the International Criminal Tribunals (OUP, 2010), at 44. 
91 A.R. Jonsen and S. Toulmin, The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning (UCP, 1989). 
92 J.S. Mart inez and A.M. Danner, 'Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the 
Development of International Criminal Law', 93 CLF (2005) 75, 96‒100. 
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risk of expanding the concept of criminal responsibility beyond its individual limits. Domestic 
criminal law systems may themselves have seen significant incursions into the vitality of the 
culpability principle, however, international criminal law seems to face distinct challenges not 
encountered by municipal criminal justice systems.  
The sui generis features of ICR reveal international criminal law's instrumental role. 
International trials are tools to enforce international law. Punishment has a denunciatory and 
educational function. Prosecutors focus on leaders to capture the systemic nature of international 
crimes. Theories of liability are created and transformed with the purpose to convict, and with 
the desire to express the guilt of those who, while responsible, had no blood on their hands. This 
instrumental character inevitably puts pressure on the principle of culpability.  
Instrumentality is not halted by a clear legal framework or a black letter law approach. To 
the contrary, it is reinforced, or at least accommodated, by rudimentary statutory law (at the ad 
hoc Tribunals) and an activist approach to law-making. Even at the ICC where the normative 
framework consists of an elaborate statute, elements of crime and a strict provision on sources of 
law (Article 21), judges have taken the opportunity to develop the law through interpretation. 
The first decisions by PTCs developing the control of the crime-theory are close to law making 
and go well beyond the mere task of confirming charges on the basis of existing law.  
 
6. Concluding Observations 
This paper develops the argument that ICR at the international level has a sui generis nature. One 
can identify intrinsic and extrinsic features that substantiate the distinctive character of criminal 
responsibility in international law. As to the intrinsic features, ICR in international law is 
distinctive in its two-tier liability scheme. This is a one-size fits all approach; while masterminds 
and executioners play a different role in the context of masterminded violence, they are punished 
on an equal basis for having committed crimes. It serves the expressive value of punishment to 
punish intellectual perpetrators as if they had blood on their hands. Yet, squeezing a two-tier 
criminality scheme into a one-tier liability model has caused linkage problems and puts pressure 
on the principle of personal culpability. The extrinsic features surfaced from an appraisal of ICR 
in international law. Criminal responsibility in international law is the product of a sui generis 
adjudication process, marked by multiculturalism and flexibility. The process of international 
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adjudication affects the shaping of liability. ICR is a dynamic concept with loose outer limits, 
increasingly forging its own path, away from its national pedigree. 
According to the above the case of ICR in international law can be termed ‘curious’ for 
two main reasons. Firstly, because of the sui generis nature; it is not simply a transplant of 
domestic legal concepts onto the international level, but a new unique creation. Secondly, 
although the principle of individual responsibility is widely accepted, it is difficult to realize in 
practice. On account of the collective and systemic nature of international crimes individual guilt 
attribution (which would not necessarily reflect reality) becomes more complicated. Moreover, 
international criminal law’s instrumental role, reflected in ICR’s flexibility, has generated broad 
liability theories that border on collective responsibility. 
 
 
